I’m sorry, but I refuse to be intimidated by a Chinese ballet class, which for all the world looked to me much like the one my daughter used to go to in London. If Shanghai produces the next Anna Pavlova, or even several of them, then that’s cause for celebration, not humiliation.
And, of course, it is quite likely to do so, for at 1.4 billion souls, there’s a big talent pool to draw from. China’s size alone dictates that in a globalised world economy, where the traditional Western advantages of superior technology, know-how and education have all but broken down, it will eventually account for a high proportion not just of top ballerinas, but scientists, brain surgeons, research breakthroughs, patents, and everything else, including crooks and deadbeats.
On its present growth trajectory, the Chinese economy will have overtaken that of the US by 2050; its manufacturing sector is already producing more. But in terms of income per head, China ranks no more than a lowly 93rd – or, roughly on a par with El Salvador and Bosnia. Average income is less than a sixth that of the US. That gap is not going to be closed nearly so easily. Indeed, a dispassionate analysis of the facts suggests it never will.
Advanced economies face some of the most difficult and intractable problems of our lifetimes; but make no mistake, these are as nothing compared to the multiple economic, social, political and environmental challenges the developing world has to deal with. The desertification of vast tracts of northern China, rampant corruption, extreme social dislocation and a growing wealth divide are not issues that can be addressed swiftly or smoothly.
China has done remarkably well so far, but the real challenge of growing from a low-ranking income country to a high one is only just beginning. All the evidence is that this second stage of development requires a much more difficult leap than the first.
In the West, the problem is one of mildly squeezed living standards and disappointed expectations. The ruinous fiscal costs of the financial crisis have made long-established health-care and pension entitlement systems look even more unaffordable than they were before. Either we have to pay more for them in taxes, or they have to be reformed. These are difficult political choices.
China starts with none of these legacy issues. The entitlement culture that burdens advanced economies is almost wholly absent. But what it does face is, potentially, a worse problem: it’s going to get old before it gets rich.
Already there is an explosion of 4-2-1 families – four grandparents, two parents and one child, or the very reverse of the traditional family structure that has ruled since the dawn of humanity. This is partly the result of the one-child policy; it’s partly increased longevity. But the upshot is that by mid-century, 30 to 40 per cent of the population will be over 65.
The one-child policy is being eased, but the demographics are already preordained. Whatever the Chinese authorities do, they cannot prevent massive ageing hitting them at a much earlier stage of development than is happening in Europe, Japan and the US. The country’s breakneck, almost reckless pace of development is instructed by this knowledge.
It would be wrong to be complacent about China. Historically, emerging economic superpowers have always been highly aggressive and expansionary in their geo-political ambitions. But let the young, nationalistic hotheads of the Chinese military spend the country’s hard-earned savings on second-rate stealth fighters and second-hand aircraft carriers if they want. That’s China’s lookout.
With fewer nuclear weapons than Israel, China is not yet a significant military threat, and though there is a disturbing swagger and assertiveness in the new arrival’s behaviour, ageing populations have very little interest in becoming one. Old people don’t tend to go to war,
nor are wars conducive to the wealth creation China so desperately needs.
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